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Saturday, November 8, 2008

Mobile Homes & Stradivarius Violins

Stricter Underwriting Standards:
Dotting “i’s” -- lots and lots of “i’s”


Until recently, once the appraisal was completed and the amount supported the purchase price, it was very unusual to hear more from the underwriter. But that’s clearly changed.

One of the biggest consequences of spiking mortgage defaults is tighter lending and underwriting standards. For home buyers, lenders, and realtors, that manifests as greatly increased scrutiny, and more “i’s” to dot and “t’s” to cross – lots more.

Mobile Homes with Stradivarius Violins

Until recently, once a home had satisfactorily appraised, the loan was typically as good as done. Now, however, it’s not unusual for multiple layers of lender review, accompanied by requests for yet more information. Or, for lenders to insist on adherence to what seem like silly rules.

To pick just one example, the lender on one recent deal required the Buyer and Seller to delete a section addressing the sale of personal property.

The concern, which can be legitimate, is that a big chunk of the value that’s securing the loan actually resides in the personal property exchanging hands, not in the home itself.

If you were borrowing $200k to buy a $50k mobile home that just happened to include a $150k Stradivarius violin, the lender clearly would have grounds for concern. That’s because if you stopped making payments on the mobile home, the value of the mobile home at foreclosure –- presumably something much less than $50k -- wouldn't be nearly enough to make the bank whole. Meanwhile, you and the Stradivarius would likely be long gone.

But that was hardly the case with my client. The purchase price of their home was over $500k -– and the value of the furniture in question was about $250 dollars. Maybe.

Oh, well.

After years in eclipse, the Golden Rule is seemingly being re-asserted . . . with a vengeance.

Friday, November 7, 2008

Defusing the Option-ARM Time Bomb

Next: Defusing the Option-ARM Time Bomb

As if enough shoes hadn't already fallen on the beleaguered national housing market, there is still one, very big one left: the option-ARM bomb, er, shoe.

To recap, first came the now-infamous, sub-prime "Liar Loans": low or no-doc loans to borrowers with poor credit, putting nothing down, to buy homes in overheated housing markets. Such loans were characterized by low teaser rates and payments that quickly re-set much higher, typically within 2-3 years.

Sure enough, 2-3 years past the housing market's 2005 peak, the double whammy of negative equity and zooming payments sunk many of the sub-prime borrowers.

Now come the option-ARM borrowers -- apparently, legions of them.

The specialty of banks like Washington Mutual and Wachovia, these loans are literally financial time bombs: instead of amortizing principal, or even just paying interest, option-ARM borrowers can "opt" to make payments so low that they don't even cover the interest due.

What happens to the shortfall? It's added to the principal, a phenomenon innocuously known as "negative amortization." Lenders I've spoken with put the amount of outstanding option-ARM loans at about the same size as sub-prime loans, around $1.5 trillion.

Wanted: 'Financial MacGyver's'

So why haven't we heard more about them?

Three reasons.

One, it's hard to be heard in a Category 5 financial hurricane.

Two, they're heavily concentrated geographically. In markets like Florida, Southern California, and Las Vegas, they accounted for a significant percentage of all loans originated at the peak. In more staid markets like the Twin Cities (my focus), reputable lenders wouldn't touch them -- and now don't have exposure to them.

Third, and perhaps most significantly, the option ARM's have long fuses: five years, to be exact.

Yes, that's right: at the height of the housing market in 2004-2006, aggressive lenders, in their infinite wisdom, gave their shakiest borrowers five years to start making real payments (and you thought the local furniture store's "no interest till 2009" pitch was generous!).

That makes fallout from the biggest wave of option ARM's due to hit in 2010-2011.

Two Ways to Disarm

So what do you do now? There are really only two options, er, choices.

One. Re-float the housing market. Higher prices mean more homeowner equity. More homeowner equity means more wherewithal to refinance, and less incentive to default.

Unfortunately, to truly disarm the option-ARM bomb, housing prices would not only have to revisit the 2005 peak, they would have to substantially exceed it. That's because all those option-ARM borrowers now owe a lot more than they originally borrowed (thank you, negative amortization).

The odds of housing prices suddenly going up 50% or more in today's environment are about the same as NASDAQ hitting 6,000.

Two. Make sure the banks have lots and lots of capital.

Clearly, that appears to be the approach embraced by the Fed, the Treasury, and the banks themselves.

How else do you explain the otherwise anomalous behavior of a bank like Wells Fargo, Wachovia's purchaser, saying it's well-capitalized on Monday, "accepting" $25 billion in federal money on Tuesday, and selling $11 billion in stock on Wednesday?

Sure it's well-capitalized. Just like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, Lehman Bros, AIG . . .

Wednesday, November 5, 2008

"Housing Micro-Markets"

New Technology Lets Realtors
Hone in on "Micro Markets"

Investors are fond of saying "it's not a stock market, it's a market of stocks." By the same token, I think of the housing market not in terms of overly broad, market-wide statistics -- which can mask a great deal of variation between neighborhoods -- but as an aggregation of dozens of micro markets.

Thanks to advances in the Multiple Listing Service ("MLS") mapping features, realtors can now capture what's happening in each of these "micro markets" with startling accuracy and precision.

Just to pick one example (there are dozens), the neighborhoods just west and south of Cedar Lake in Minneapolis have really had some nice appreciation the last five years. The lots are big, location is great, and there are a lot of well-built '50's ramblers that, because they need a lot of updating, are relatively cheap.

So demand has been pretty strong (it's also the market I live in and have done a lot of deals). Once you get within a block or so of Cedar Lake, the land alone can be worth high six figures.

On MLS, the aforementioned Cedar Lake area straddles Minneapolis and St. Louis Park, and areas 300 and 391. Searching only by city or MLS area or gives you a very different -- and overbroad -- market picture.

Using the MLS mapping tool, I can basically draw an L-shaped map hugging Cedar Lake and generate my own, custom (and much truer) market statistics. These include average selling price per square foot, average days on the market, price trends, inventory trends, etc.

Armed with these numbers, I can leave the headlines behind, and tell clients what's really going on in the corner of the market that matters to them most.

'Underwater' vs. Foreclosure

"'Underwater' Need Not Mean Foreclosure"

That's the title of a nice article in today's Wall Street Journal. The article's author makes the point -- which I have observed -- that most people who owe more than their home is worth keep making payments, regardless.

Assuming they can.

According to the article, the two biggest factors causing people to mail their lender the keys (so-called "jingle mail") are financial wherewithal, and the expectation that their home price will eventually recover. Of course, homeowners who default know -- or should -- that their credit will be wrecked for years to come.

Future Expectations Key

So what does the foregoing tell you about likely foreclosure rates this cycle?

That the key is whether "underwater" homeowners view their situation as temporary or permanent.

By that reasoning, areas of the country with rosy long-term outlooks, like San Diego, Boston, and Denver, will likely experience relatively fewer foreclosures. Declining, economically depressed cities like Detroit will have it rougher (what's new??)