Wrong Doctor, Wrong Prescription?
"No problem can be solved from the same level of consciousness that created it." --Albert Einstein
Imagine that your doctor, over the course of a year in which your health steadily deteriorated, misdiagnosed gallstones as an ulcer; botched an operation to repair torn knee ligaments, leaving you hobbled; and was surprised that your difficulty breathing turned out to be pneumonia.
Now, the same doctor says you need emergency open heart surgery to open your dangerously clogged arteries. Or you'll die. Very soon.
Oh, and your doctor spectacularly overcharged for all the above-mentioned procedures, and, along with his partners, owns the medical practice that profited (or did, before he sold his interest for $600 million).
Lucrative Practice
It would certainly give you pause. You might even consider getting a second (or third) opinion. Or, when you come to your (remaining) senses . . . firing the doctor and getting a new one who's actually skilled, as well as honest.
In this case, the doctor is Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson; the medical practice is Wall Street -- specifically firms like Goldman Sachs (which Paulson ran before becoming Treasury Secretary); and the beleagured patient is the U.S. financial system, "backstopped" (what isn't lately?) by taxpayers.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
Saturday, September 27, 2008
Moral Hazard, illustrated
Wall Street Bailout Bill:
Trickle-down Financial Aid?
As the lead in the movie "Knocked Up" might say, "Moral Hazard, shmoral hazard."
If you've been befuddled by the term -- and seem to be hearing it bantered about lately, in connection with the Wall St. bailout -- think of it this way:
Imagine that, instead of giving Wall Street $700 billion to heal its balance sheets and encourage it to lend again (trickle-down financial aid?), the U.S. government decided to pay everyone's heating bill this winter.* (By the way, such a gesture would arguably be a much better way to address Americans' collective economic distress at the moment.)
The problem with such a "no one left in the cold" government program is that it would create a host of negative side effects and unintended consequences.
Thermostat Settings
If the government were suddenly picking up the nation's energy tab, you'd guess that the utilities might suddenly decide to charge more. Meanwhile, instead of keeping the heat at a conservative 68 degrees (or lower), some people might be tempted to indulge, and set it to a more comfortable 75 degrees.
Since houses vary in size, people's energy bills vary, too; would the program take that into account? For that matter, why should people in chilly Minnesota and Maine get more per capita than Floridians? (Answer: to offset sugar subsidies Florida companies get).
If the government suddenly paid everyone's heating bills, what incentive would homeowners have to spend money on insulation or window repairs?
Finally, lots of people, fortunately, are able to pay their bills without any help. Does the government help them, too? If not, isn't that unfair to people who've saved more of their money, decided to live in smaller, more-energy efficient homes, etc.?
RTC "Round-Trippers"
Now go back to the proposed $700 billion Wall Street bailout.
Who prices the bad debt the government is to buy? What kinds of debt are eligible? Which institutions get to sell to the government? Who is eligible to buy the bad debt? (The Resolution Trust Corp. created to clean up the S&L mess 20 years ago witnessed the unsavory situation of many bankers whose seized S&L's funded inflated commercial real estate on the way up, buying it for cents on the dollar from the RTC on the way down -- call them "round-trippers.")
It keeps going: What kind of quid pro quo does the government get in return? (Equity, salary caps, etc.) Why $700 billion instead of $500B, $1 trillion, or some other number? What assurance do taxpayers have that Wall Street won't quickly ask for more? Etc. , etc., etc.
Besides being incredibly complex, all of the foregoing issues implicate something called "moral hazard": the risk that good behavior is punished, and bad behavior rewarded.
To avoid that, ideally, government bailouts should be reluctant, rare, and no bigger than absolutely necessary. The problem with the latest bailout proposal is that, at the moment, it appears to be none of those things.
*To put in perspective exactly how big $700 billion is, it would likely pay the country's winter heating bills not for one year, but 20!! Feel free to substitute your own, "what-would-$700-billion-pay-for" social program(s) here.
Trickle-down Financial Aid?
As the lead in the movie "Knocked Up" might say, "Moral Hazard, shmoral hazard."
If you've been befuddled by the term -- and seem to be hearing it bantered about lately, in connection with the Wall St. bailout -- think of it this way:
Imagine that, instead of giving Wall Street $700 billion to heal its balance sheets and encourage it to lend again (trickle-down financial aid?), the U.S. government decided to pay everyone's heating bill this winter.* (By the way, such a gesture would arguably be a much better way to address Americans' collective economic distress at the moment.)
The problem with such a "no one left in the cold" government program is that it would create a host of negative side effects and unintended consequences.
Thermostat Settings
If the government were suddenly picking up the nation's energy tab, you'd guess that the utilities might suddenly decide to charge more. Meanwhile, instead of keeping the heat at a conservative 68 degrees (or lower), some people might be tempted to indulge, and set it to a more comfortable 75 degrees.
Since houses vary in size, people's energy bills vary, too; would the program take that into account? For that matter, why should people in chilly Minnesota and Maine get more per capita than Floridians? (Answer: to offset sugar subsidies Florida companies get).
If the government suddenly paid everyone's heating bills, what incentive would homeowners have to spend money on insulation or window repairs?
Finally, lots of people, fortunately, are able to pay their bills without any help. Does the government help them, too? If not, isn't that unfair to people who've saved more of their money, decided to live in smaller, more-energy efficient homes, etc.?
RTC "Round-Trippers"
Now go back to the proposed $700 billion Wall Street bailout.
Who prices the bad debt the government is to buy? What kinds of debt are eligible? Which institutions get to sell to the government? Who is eligible to buy the bad debt? (The Resolution Trust Corp. created to clean up the S&L mess 20 years ago witnessed the unsavory situation of many bankers whose seized S&L's funded inflated commercial real estate on the way up, buying it for cents on the dollar from the RTC on the way down -- call them "round-trippers.")
It keeps going: What kind of quid pro quo does the government get in return? (Equity, salary caps, etc.) Why $700 billion instead of $500B, $1 trillion, or some other number? What assurance do taxpayers have that Wall Street won't quickly ask for more? Etc. , etc., etc.
Besides being incredibly complex, all of the foregoing issues implicate something called "moral hazard": the risk that good behavior is punished, and bad behavior rewarded.
To avoid that, ideally, government bailouts should be reluctant, rare, and no bigger than absolutely necessary. The problem with the latest bailout proposal is that, at the moment, it appears to be none of those things.
*To put in perspective exactly how big $700 billion is, it would likely pay the country's winter heating bills not for one year, but 20!! Feel free to substitute your own, "what-would-$700-billion-pay-for" social program(s) here.
Thursday, September 25, 2008
Enron Squared
Mother of all Bailouts Likely to Spawn
Mother of all Litigation
It turns out that Enron was just a harbinger.
For those who don't remember, Enron was a cutting-edge energy company that spectacularly collapsed in 2002. At the heart of the melt-down were complex securities that few people outside the company even knew existed, let alone understood (it turns out that people inside Enron didn't exactly understand them either -- or at least that's what they claimed at trial).
Thanks to the accounting rules at the time -- which the industry helped write -- Enron officials argued that they didn't have to disclose billions in off-balance sheet obligations that would ultimately sink the company.
Sound familiar?
As one commentator put it, "Enron is long gone, but this episode . . . [was] as much a warning for our financial security as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was to the threat of wider terrorism." ("The Crisis Last Time"; The New York Times, 9/24/08).
Superficial Reform
Congress' response to Enron was something called Sarbanes-Oxley, essentially a piece of legislation mandating better accounting controls, as well as fuller disclosure. Post-Enron, senior management also had to personally vouch for ("certify") the accuracy of the financial statements that they were signing.
Big business has screamed ever since that Sar-Box, as it's known, imposed wasteful costs and hindered American competitiveness.
Well, so does a $700 billion Wall Street bail-out, not to mention all the other economic fall-out associated with the ongoing financial crisis.
Mother of all Litigation
At this point in the mess, about the only thing that can be predicted with confidence is that the mother of all financial crises will eventually give rise to the mother of all litigation.
At least on this score, the Enron legacy (and legal precedent) is encouraging.
At trial, Enron Chairman and CEO Ken Lay famously argued that he was out of the loop at his own company, and didn't understand its house-of-cards financial structure. Unfortunately, the evidence showed that Lay in fact did know what was going on, and he was subsequently convicted.
Even if the jury believed Lay, it still could have convicted him on the alternative grounds that he should have known. After all, when you're paid hundreds of millions, that would seem to be part of your job description.
"Knew -- or Should Have"
It is precisely this Hobson's choice that's likely to confront senior Wall Street executives when it's their turn as defendants.
If they knew the risks they exposed their shareholders to -- not to mention the broader economy -- but didn't adequately disclose them, they're guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. On the other hand, if they didn't know, but should have, they're guilty of gross negligence.
Of course, theoretically, you can be both incompetent and dishonest . . .
P.S.: Ultimately, the narrow legal ground Enron officials were convicted on involved "cooking the books" as the company's financial situation deteriorated near the end. It would be a big surprise if executives at many Wall Street companies didn't do the same (See, "FBI Looks into 4 Firms at the Center of the Economic Turmoil"; The New York Times, 9/24/08)
Mother of all Litigation
It turns out that Enron was just a harbinger.
For those who don't remember, Enron was a cutting-edge energy company that spectacularly collapsed in 2002. At the heart of the melt-down were complex securities that few people outside the company even knew existed, let alone understood (it turns out that people inside Enron didn't exactly understand them either -- or at least that's what they claimed at trial).
Thanks to the accounting rules at the time -- which the industry helped write -- Enron officials argued that they didn't have to disclose billions in off-balance sheet obligations that would ultimately sink the company.
Sound familiar?
As one commentator put it, "Enron is long gone, but this episode . . . [was] as much a warning for our financial security as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was to the threat of wider terrorism." ("The Crisis Last Time"; The New York Times, 9/24/08).
Superficial Reform
Congress' response to Enron was something called Sarbanes-Oxley, essentially a piece of legislation mandating better accounting controls, as well as fuller disclosure. Post-Enron, senior management also had to personally vouch for ("certify") the accuracy of the financial statements that they were signing.
Big business has screamed ever since that Sar-Box, as it's known, imposed wasteful costs and hindered American competitiveness.
Well, so does a $700 billion Wall Street bail-out, not to mention all the other economic fall-out associated with the ongoing financial crisis.
Mother of all Litigation
At this point in the mess, about the only thing that can be predicted with confidence is that the mother of all financial crises will eventually give rise to the mother of all litigation.
At least on this score, the Enron legacy (and legal precedent) is encouraging.
At trial, Enron Chairman and CEO Ken Lay famously argued that he was out of the loop at his own company, and didn't understand its house-of-cards financial structure. Unfortunately, the evidence showed that Lay in fact did know what was going on, and he was subsequently convicted.
Even if the jury believed Lay, it still could have convicted him on the alternative grounds that he should have known. After all, when you're paid hundreds of millions, that would seem to be part of your job description.
"Knew -- or Should Have"
It is precisely this Hobson's choice that's likely to confront senior Wall Street executives when it's their turn as defendants.
If they knew the risks they exposed their shareholders to -- not to mention the broader economy -- but didn't adequately disclose them, they're guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation. On the other hand, if they didn't know, but should have, they're guilty of gross negligence.
Of course, theoretically, you can be both incompetent and dishonest . . .
P.S.: Ultimately, the narrow legal ground Enron officials were convicted on involved "cooking the books" as the company's financial situation deteriorated near the end. It would be a big surprise if executives at many Wall Street companies didn't do the same (See, "FBI Looks into 4 Firms at the Center of the Economic Turmoil"; The New York Times, 9/24/08)
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Fending Off Lowball Offers, or . .
"How I got My Seller an Extra $10k Last Week"
Low -- if not lowball -- offers succeed more than they should because too often, Sellers are sitting ducks. The only one on the scene, circling like a vulture, is the would-be Buyer, who gradually wears down a desperate Seller who thinks they have no other options.
Wrong. The correct strategy is to work with the low offer, and try to bring it up. At the same time, however, it's crucial that the Agent representing the Seller (Listing Agent) continues to push hard on other fronts, to attract other Buyers.
That's what I did last week. First, I sent my favorite photographer to take some new, flattering shots. Then, to re-attract the market's attention, I advised my client to cancel the listing and bring it back on as new, without changing the price.
That's a common strategy to make sure that a listing that has fallen to the bottom of the heap after perhaps 40-60 days on the market gets put back at the top (in this case, the home had been on 43 days, but most of that was in August, which can be especially slow).
Then, I re-contacted agents who'd previously shown the property.
While all this was happening, my client continued to negotiate with the would-be lowballer who, sure enough, gradually raised their offer from low to merely mediocre.
Unfortunately for them, they dragged their feet a little too long.
When the gap between Buyer and Seller and had dwindled to literally less than $2,500, a "White Knight" Buyer emerged with an offer $10k above the would-be lowballer's. Annoyed with the first Buyer's tactics, my client quickly negotiated a Purchase Agreement with the White Knight.
Moral of the story: if you really want a property, be satisfied with a modest (vs. outrageous) discount from a fair listing price. If you won't -- or can't -- you leave the door open for another Buyer who will.
Low -- if not lowball -- offers succeed more than they should because too often, Sellers are sitting ducks. The only one on the scene, circling like a vulture, is the would-be Buyer, who gradually wears down a desperate Seller who thinks they have no other options.
Wrong. The correct strategy is to work with the low offer, and try to bring it up. At the same time, however, it's crucial that the Agent representing the Seller (Listing Agent) continues to push hard on other fronts, to attract other Buyers.
That's what I did last week. First, I sent my favorite photographer to take some new, flattering shots. Then, to re-attract the market's attention, I advised my client to cancel the listing and bring it back on as new, without changing the price.
That's a common strategy to make sure that a listing that has fallen to the bottom of the heap after perhaps 40-60 days on the market gets put back at the top (in this case, the home had been on 43 days, but most of that was in August, which can be especially slow).
Then, I re-contacted agents who'd previously shown the property.
While all this was happening, my client continued to negotiate with the would-be lowballer who, sure enough, gradually raised their offer from low to merely mediocre.
Unfortunately for them, they dragged their feet a little too long.
When the gap between Buyer and Seller and had dwindled to literally less than $2,500, a "White Knight" Buyer emerged with an offer $10k above the would-be lowballer's. Annoyed with the first Buyer's tactics, my client quickly negotiated a Purchase Agreement with the White Knight.
Moral of the story: if you really want a property, be satisfied with a modest (vs. outrageous) discount from a fair listing price. If you won't -- or can't -- you leave the door open for another Buyer who will.
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