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Showing posts with label securitization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label securitization. Show all posts

Thursday, October 14, 2010

Are Title Insurance Companies Bracing for a Tidal Wave of Claims? Nah.

National Moratorium
on Foreclosures

Surprise, Surprise . . . the same banking behemoths that recklessly originated trillions in dubious mortgages -- fuel for Wall Street's securitization juggernaut -- are apparently now running roughshod over the rights of delinquent borrowers as they seek to foreclose on their homes.

How big a problem is this?

And who's going to pay for it?

Background

To investigate (a little), I checked the stocks of three, large publicly-traded title insurance companies.

My theory is that if hundreds of thousands (millions?) of homes were wrongfully foreclosed on, there is going to be a tsunami of title insurance claims in the offing, brought by Buyers of those homes who in fact . . . may own nothing.

So, is the stock market clobbering the largest, publicly traded title insurance companies, in anticipation of all those pending claims?

Claims? What Claims?

Hardly.

Three of the biggest, publicly traded title insurance companies -- Fidelity National, First American Financial, and Old Republic -- are all trading in the middle of (or above) their 52 week price ranges.

Which is certainly curious, given their presumed exposure to this brewing mess.

I don't have a ready explanation, but my guesses are: 1) the companies somehow don't do much business in the markets (FL, CA, Las Vegas) where the problem is greatest; 2) they've already reinsured or otherwise laid off the risk of those claims (or think they have -- can you say, "insolvent counter-party?"); and/or 3) the title insurance companies -- and their investors -- figure that the banks, not they, will ultimately bear responsibility.

And by "the banks," I mean "us" -- the taxpayers now standing behind those too-big-to-fail entities.

P.S.: maybe "tidal wave" should be "title wave."

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

Grandparent and Grandchild Bubbles

A 30 Year Overview of Commercial Real Estate

Did you know that bubbles can have progeny?

That's John Carney's take, in his treatise-length (but extremely worthwhile) post, "How A Government Bailout Created Today's Commercial Real Estate Catastrophe" (Clusterstock; 11/16/2009).

According to Carney, today's commercial real estate bubble is actually a "grandchild" bubble; the "grandparent" was the bubble that resulted from letting commercial banks branch out into commercial real estate loans in the early '80's.

Carney does a remarkable job of presenting three decades of government policy toward banks -- and tracing the consequences of same.

One of his (not so surprising) insights is the extent to which commercial real estate the last three decades has been driven by financing (or the lack thereof) -- vs., say, fundamentals like supply and demand.

One other nugget: the securitization phenomemon that ended up wreaking so much havoc with residential real estate the last few years dates back to government clean-up efforts following the S&L bust in the early '90's.

In essence, securitization acted like a giant sponge, allowing the Resolution Trust Corporation -- the government entity charged with overseeing the S&L cleanup -- to expeditiously sell off thousands of mortgages at a time, in literally millions of tiny slices.

Sound familiar?

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Reviving "Animal Spirits"

Less Trust = Simpler Financial System

"The more complex the transaction, the more trust is needed to sustain the transaction."

--Robert Shiller, "Animal Spirits Depend on Trust"; The Wall Street Journal (1/27/2009)

Robert Shiller, the Yale economist who made his name calling the 2000 Stock Market Bubble, has an excellent piece in Tuesday's Wall Street Journal explaining where the financial system is right now, and exactly how it got there.

In an era when trust has been shattered, securitization and derivatives are out, "plain vanilla" debt and credit -- and a lot less of them -- are in.

Tuesday, January 6, 2009

Short Sale Hurdles

Pursuing a Short Sale?
Better Be Patient

One of the reasons that a "short sale" can be so protracted is all the decision makers involved.

For those who aren't familiar, a short sale is when a listed home is worth less than the mortgage against it. Rather than foreclose, the lender can often do better, i.e., lose less money, by agreeing to instead reduce the mortgage balance it is owed.

Make that lenders, plural.

The flip side of the securitization phenomenon, by which millions of individual loans got bundled and sold to investors worldwide, is the logistical nightmare that results when housing prices tank.

Before securitization, a short sale required one lender to sign off. Now, that number can easily be 15 or 20 . . .