Jeremy Grantham, Animal Spirits, and "Bubble Business"

"Don't Just Stand There -- Buy Something!"

Some people wait for a new episode of a favorite TV series (Seinfeld, The Sopranos).

Others for a new album from a favorite artist.

I look forward to Jeremy Grantham's latest quarterly newsletter. Seriously.

The man's honest, brilliantly insightful -- and a great writer, to boot:

Greenspan was lucky enough to inherit Volcker’s good work, and that gave him a base from which he could launch or blow a huge equity bubble; he also had the advantage that the country’s balance sheet was in excellent shape. Even Bernanke inherited a reasonably solid position from which to fund a second bailout. But a third time? It is hard to work out where the resources would come from to resuscitate the economy if a real shock were to be delivered by another collapse of a major asset class.

--Jeremy Grantham, "Playing With Fire"; GMO Q1 2010 Newsletter

Subscribing to the notion that the "bigger the bubble, the more damaging the bust," what is Grantham's antidote?

"We had better hope that something lucky turns up to break the speculative spirit."

"Psst! Mr. Greenspan!"

"Bubble," Defined

For the benefit of Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who professed an inability to identify a bubble before it popped, here is the clearest, most concise definition I've seen yet:

Currency is like any financial innovation, an obligation secured by assets. When the obligation is perceived to have increased far beyond the level justifiable by the assets, which in this case make up a country’s economy, a bubble has formed.

--Alice Schroeder, Bloomberg (Oct. 1, 2009)

There Mr. Greenspan, clear enough?

"The Biggest Loser"

Revisionist History

As historians know full well, Presidential reputations sometimes take decades to settle out, experiencing ups and downs in the meantime.

For example, Harry Truman left office in 1953 quite unpopular.

Over time, though, his stock gradually rose as society came to appreciate -- after the fact -- his straight-talking populism, common sense, and decency.

It also helped that, unlike contemporaries, later generations were less inclined to see him in FDR's (enormous) shadow.

Ironically, Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, was another politician who left office under appreciated.

Viewed through the prism of the tumultuous '60's and turbulent '70's, the relatively placid '50's that Eisenhower presided over could easily inspire nostalgia a generation later. The nation's top general in World War II, his prescient valedictory warning about the "military-industrial complex" has also endeared him to posterity.

Finally, later generations, who only caught glimpses of JFK's charisma on movie reels, were more inclined to focus on JFK's substance and record (promising but incomplete) rather than his style (dazzling).

Today's Crop of Leaders

So, roughly two years into what appears to be shaping up as The Great Recession, how do today's leaders and recent-leaders fare?

Using a scale of minus-100 (-100) to plus-100 (+100), here's my take on the shifts to date:

Paul Volcker. Then: 50; Now: 100. Net gain: +50. Steered the country through the last comparable mess in the early '80's. Never worked for Goldman Sachs -- or aspired to. None of this would have happened on his watch. Tall Paul, indeed.

Alan Greenspan: Then: 90; Now: -75. Net loss: -165 (sets "the Biggest Loser" bar for a long time). "The maestro" now "the charlatan." Every one of his major tenets and policies have now been discredited if not repudiated, i.e., : 1) markets are self-regulating; 2) the Fed's job is to mitigate the damage from bubbles, not identify and prevent them; 3) financial actors pursue self-preservation above all other goals (wrong! they chase short-term profits and maximum compensation); and 4) excessively accommodative monetary policies don't risk liquidity traps (wrong! they do -- and we're clearly in one now).

Bill Clinton: Then: 40. Now: 10. Net loss: -30. The "Party Hearty" President from Arkansas (by way of Yale and Oxford). If the 1990's were the 1920's redux, that makes Clinton this era's Coolidge -- a feel good, go-with-the-flow leader whose lieutenants (Rubin, Summers, et al) did everything they could to keep the party going.

Ronald Reagan: Then: 60. Now: 40. Net loss: -20. Yeah, he gets splattered by this, too. Conservatives' darling, he pushed the pendulum rightward at a time when there was a strong case for it (sorry, liberals, but the Great Society overshot, and Carter never measured up). Unfortunately, the pendulum . . . kept going.

On the other hand, Reagan's resolve and optimism were a welcome tonic after Carter's malaise. He also gets much credit for the demise of the Soviet Union ("a good thing," as Martha Stewart would say).

Bonus question: if Reagan had been President 20 years later, would he have recognized the financial excesses, and shifted course? (He did finally fire Don Regan, formerly head of Merrill Lynch, but mostly because he was a jerk, not over policy disagreements).

Herbert Hoover: Then: -90. Now: -40. Net gain: +50. OK, he screwed it up. But it was harder to get right than we thought. At least his Treasury Secretary did what he thought was best for the country, not his own pocket or Goldman Sachs'.

FDR: Then: +70. Now: +90. Net gain: +20. Another beneficiary of "it was harder to get right than we thought." They were lucky to have him (and where's ours??)

George W. Bush: Who?

1930's vs. 1990's

Fascinating Juxtaposition

The two photos above, from today's New York Times, present a fascinating juxtaposition.

The photo on the left shows FDR signing legislation -- known as The Glass-Steagall Act -- separating the nation's investment banks from its commercial banks. It was the latter that held ordinary Americans' savings deposits, and it was the former's plundering of same that played a big role in causing The Great Depression.

The photo on the right shows Bill Clinton signing legislation in 1999 dismantling Glass-Steagall.

Study in Contrasts

But for the fact that the people in the two photos are exclusively older, white males, the contrasts couldn't be more startling.

The Congressmen and senior government officials surrounding FDR look sombre, if not grim. Their demeanor suggests that they had just witnessed a horrific financial accident (if not crime) -- one which they are determined not to ever let happen again.

Of couse, they had, and they (mostly) did. To their credit, their efforts to safeguard the nation's financial system succeeded for more than three-quarters of a century.

By contrast, Bill Clinton and the officials around him -- luminaries such as Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, Texas Senator Phil Gramm, and Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin -- look like they're re-filling the punch bowl at an especially raucous party.

Which of course, they were.

Less than 2 years later, the stock market cratered.

Less than a decade later, a lethal combination of investment bank risk and leverage -- just like in The Great Depression -- created the greatest financial crisis since the 1930's.

"Greenspan Did It"

Adjustable Rate Mortgages the Missing Link

What about Greenspan's argument that he only controlled short-term rates? And that short rates became decoupled from long-term rates in 2002? Nonsense, says [Stanford Professor John] Taylor. Surely the existence of adjustable-rate mortgages (accounting for about one-third of mortgages starting in 2003) linked the mortgage market and short-term rates.

--Susan Lee, "It Really Is All Greenspan's Fault"; Forbes (4/3/09)

One of the more interesting debates within economics circles is exactly how culpable former Fed Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan is for the housing bubble. Put me in the camp that says, "very."

Greenspan has protested -- and continues to protest -- that as Fed Chairman he was only responsible for setting short-term interest rates.

True enough.

But thanks to the explosion of adjustable rate mortgages -- encouraged by none other than Greenspan himself -- dirt-cheap, short-term interest rates quickly spilled over into the housing market.

As a result, Greenspan's drive to lower rates in the wake of the tech stock bust and the post-9/11 recession directly led to vast, new sums of capital being made available to home buyers.

The rest, as they say, is history.