Mortgage Foreclosure Mess
Two weeks or so into the mortgage foreclosure mess, some of the dust is settling regarding what could potentially be hundreds of thousands of homes improperly foreclosed upon by the big banks.
First, what's not going to happen: people who lost their homes in such fashion are not going to get them back, with their mortgage somehow erased.
My guess is that people are watching too much CSI, or Perry Mason re-runs, or whatever TV program shows "perps" walking because of a technicality (due to police improperly seizing evidence, not informing defendants of their Miranda rights, etc.).
News flash: if you were months (or years) delinquent on your mortgage and were foreclosed on as a result . . . the courts ain't giving you your house back.
Issue #2: Banks' Put-Back Exposure
Meanwhile, the issue that very much appears in play is whether the big banks will have to effectively buy back billions in mortgages they sold to investors.
The same sloppy documentation that led to defective foreclosures apparently may also be legal grounds for investors to escape billions in losses on now very soured mortgages.
If investors can show that the banks misrepresented the types and characteristics of the mortgages they securitized (bundled) and sold, they may essentially be able to return them for a full refund.
Bracing for that possibility (and the huge losses that would result), the stock market has punished the share prices of several big banks.
Showing posts with label defective foreclosure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label defective foreclosure. Show all posts
Friday, October 22, 2010
Saturday, October 16, 2010
Update: "National Moratorium on Foreclosures"
Make That Four Theories
(#4. Overreaction)
In my post on Thursday, "National Moratorium on Foreclosures," I puzzled over the seeming disconnect between the stocks of publicly-traded title insurance companies (barely affected), and the supposed tidal wave of claims headed their way due to defective mortgage foreclosures.
I posited three possible explanations: 1) the aforementioned companies don't have exposure in the markets where the problems are most severe; 2) they've already laid off their risk, through reinsurance, derivatives, or the like; and/or 3) the banks, not the title insurance companies, are going to take the hit.
Based on this week's stock market action, the clear winner is theory #3 (all the too-big-to-fail banks -- including Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase -- had rough weeks).
SARS vs. AIDS
But I'd now also add a fourth theory: the problem, while serious, has been exaggerated.
Think of it as the financial equivalent of a possible health epidemic.
In 2003, much of the developed world was bracing for a full-blown outbreak of SARS ("severe acute respiratory syndrome").
The quick spike in (well-documented) cases -- fanned by all manner of media -- was certainly alarming.
And SARS in fact was extremely lethal if contracted.
But ultimately, nothing like the pandemic officials initially feared occurred.
Other scares like West Nile virus have followed the same trajectory.
It's too soon to tell -- all 50 state attorneys general are now looking into the matter -- but it's possible that the stories about homeowners with no mortgages having their locks changed in the middle of the night are the (rare) exception, not the rule.
At least in Minnesota, the fact that I haven't heard first-person accounts from a pretty broad circle of clients and friends tells me that that's at least plausible.
(#4. Overreaction)
In my post on Thursday, "National Moratorium on Foreclosures," I puzzled over the seeming disconnect between the stocks of publicly-traded title insurance companies (barely affected), and the supposed tidal wave of claims headed their way due to defective mortgage foreclosures.
I posited three possible explanations: 1) the aforementioned companies don't have exposure in the markets where the problems are most severe; 2) they've already laid off their risk, through reinsurance, derivatives, or the like; and/or 3) the banks, not the title insurance companies, are going to take the hit.
Based on this week's stock market action, the clear winner is theory #3 (all the too-big-to-fail banks -- including Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and JP Morgan Chase -- had rough weeks).
SARS vs. AIDS
But I'd now also add a fourth theory: the problem, while serious, has been exaggerated.
Think of it as the financial equivalent of a possible health epidemic.
In 2003, much of the developed world was bracing for a full-blown outbreak of SARS ("severe acute respiratory syndrome").
The quick spike in (well-documented) cases -- fanned by all manner of media -- was certainly alarming.
And SARS in fact was extremely lethal if contracted.
But ultimately, nothing like the pandemic officials initially feared occurred.
Other scares like West Nile virus have followed the same trajectory.
It's too soon to tell -- all 50 state attorneys general are now looking into the matter -- but it's possible that the stories about homeowners with no mortgages having their locks changed in the middle of the night are the (rare) exception, not the rule.
At least in Minnesota, the fact that I haven't heard first-person accounts from a pretty broad circle of clients and friends tells me that that's at least plausible.
Friday, October 15, 2010
No money for foreclosure staff? Hmm, I wonder why . .
"I Gave (and Gave) at the Office"
It's awfully hard to buy the line that banks may not have -- ahem -- strictly complied with the letter of the law in foreclosing upon hundreds of thousands of homes because they were understaffed.
Let's see . . .
Take the staggering compensation earned by guys like Ken Lewis (ex-CEO of Bank of America) and Jamie Dimon (current CEO of JP Morgan Chase) -- call it, conservatively, $200 million apiece since 2000; divide by what a real worker -- not a "Burger King" flunkie -- makes (call it $40,000 a year); and what do you get?
Money for 5,000 foreclosure positions at each bank.
Think that would have avoided a few problems??
P.S.: what would the government do to an airline that paid its executives millions while neglecting basic plane maintenance and safety?
If there then was a crash -- and we're still dealing with the consequences of a horrific (financial) crash -- you can bet that there'd be hell to pay (not billions in bailout money, with virtually no questions asked).
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